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Financial stability in low-inflation environments
1 




Price stability does not seem to have reduced the possibility of boom-bust cycles in asset markets 
and banking crises. This paper identifies common underlying patterns for financial crises over the 
period 1970-2002. Crises tend to be correlated with one another and concentrated in specific 
subperiods. 
1. Introduction 
There has been increased attention in the recent literature to the factors underlying financial crises. A 
common feature of many of these studies is the finding that weak economic fundamentals contribute 
to crises by allowing imbalances to accumulate (eg Mishkin (2000)). However, although the probability 
of crises may well be reduced in countries where the fundamentals appear to be sound, it does not fall 
to zero (Bordo et al (2000)). This study therefore analyses the characteristics of crises that occur in 
periods of (apparent) macroeconomic stability. How real, at present, is the possibility of crises 
developing in advanced countries, and are there patterns that are typical of these crises? In order to 
retain the relevance for the industrialised world, we do not include other countries in our assessment 
as crises in these countries may be due to factors that do not apply in industrialised economies 
(Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999)). 
We focus on banking crises and on bust periods in asset markets. Both of these can have significant 
macroeconomic impacts - and may feed on each other. Another potential source of crises, exchange 
rate movements, has become less important. Most of the countries we consider have abandoned fixed 
exchange rate regimes, thereby removing a potential source of macroeconomic tension. Instead, they 
have joined a currency union or have chosen freely floating exchange rates.  
The paper continues in Section 2 with a discussion of how crises can develop. Section 3 contains an 
empirical analysis of crisis episodes and patterns of key variables around these crises. Conclusions 
are drawn in Section 4. 
2. Anatomy  of  crises 
Two main types of financial crises in industrialised economies are problems at individual financial 
institutions (banking crises) and asset price busts. Banking crises are particularly devastating when a 
problem in one or a few institutions spreads unchecked across the financial system. This systemic risk 
results from institutions having various exposures with one another. 
Banking and asset price crises can be interrelated. Asset market busts are likely to cause financial 
sector troubles if balance sheets of both financial and non-financial firms are weak. This is particularly 
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the case for financial firms, as an asset price crash can seriously compromise their financial health. 
Non-financial sector balance sheets also matter, since declining net worth in combination with 
asymmetric information problems may amplify financial crises (Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). 
Expectations play an important role in the triggering and spread of banking and asset price crises, due 
to the lack of full information on underlying values of investment projects.  
2.1  Price stability and crises 
In an environment with price stability, inflation and inflationary expectations are low and stable. In the 
countries covered in this paper, inflation has been mostly below or close to 3% since the mid-1980s. In 
theory, threats to financial stability are less likely to emerge in an environment with price stability (eg 
Schwartz (1995), Mishkin (2000)). First, price stability tends to reduce uncertainty regarding future 
economic conditions. This fosters balanced risk-return decision-making and reduces financial risks. 
Second, in such an environment, volatility in nominal interest rates is less likely. Mishkin (1991) shows 
that in the US most financial crises began with a sharp monetary policy contraction. Third, with price 
stability, debt contracts tend to be of a long duration and denominated in domestic currency. This 
makes an economy less vulnerable to sentiments of both domestic and foreign creditors. 
However, price stability is no guarantee of financial stability. It can be argued that the credibility of the 
central bank’s commitment to price stability, by anchoring inflationary expectations at low and stable 
levels, can make prices and wages stickier. This will reduce the inflationary pressures usually 
associated with unsustainably strong demand, but it can also allow financial imbalances to build up 
(Borio and Lowe (2002)). If temporary favourable supply side developments in times of strong 
economic performance and price stability are incorrectly perceived as permanent, excessive optimism 
about economic prospects and asset prices may emerge. This can lead to overinvestment and 
excessive credit growth. In this context, asset price inflation and credit growth may reinforce each 
other: higher collateral values allow for higher credit expansion, resulting in further asset purchases at 
higher prices. Accordingly, an unsustainable asset inflation-credit spiral may develop.  
2.2  Liberalisation and crises 
Financial market reform
3 and capital account liberalisation have also been associated with crises, as 
discussed in, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) or Bakker and Chapple (2002). Prior 
to reform, lending levels and interest rates have typically been kept artificially low by direct government 
controls. In such a situation, credit rationing is common practice, with lending decisions based on close 
relationships between banks and customers. Reform and liberalisation are likely to boost competition, 
forcing financial institutions to change their behaviour in order to remain competitive. The removal of 
credit rationing promotes an increase in the supply of credit, while banks may also be keen to expand 
lending in order to gain market share. However, risk and credit assessment skills do not necessarily keep 
pace with the changing market environment. The increased availability of credit, combined with a view 
that reforms have increased the potential economic growth rate, is likely to result in asset price rises. As 
noted in Section 2.1, such increases in asset prices can become self-sustaining for a certain period of 
time. 
2.3  After the crisis 
A severe financial crisis will disrupt financial intermediation as adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems increase, causing a sharp drop in lending. Because of the central role of the financial sector 
in industrial countries, this will damage the macroeconomy. In response to lower lending, the private 
sector will cut spending, resulting in a contraction of the real economy. In addition, monetary policy will 
be hampered by a banking crisis, as financial institutions are a pivotal link in the chain of monetary 
transmission. Distortions or poor corporate governance in the financial sector may amplify monetary 
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policy errors, since they can lead to insufficient risk assessment in an environment with strong credit 
and asset price increases. 
3. Empirical  analysis 
We analyse quarterly data over the period 1970 Q1-2002 Q2 for a group of 20 industrial countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. We first examine the incidence of crisis episodes over time to see whether these can be 
related to each other and to more general macroeconomic developments. We subsequently analyse the 
average pattern of key macroeconomic variables before and after financial crises.
4 Potential leading 
indicators have been selected on the basis of theoretical considerations and data availability. 
3.1  Data and definitions 
We consider two types of financial crises: banking crises and asset market busts, where the latter are 
further split into housing market and stock market crises. These crisis episodes are determined as 
follows: 
•  Banking crises are characterised by financial distress resulting in the erosion of most or all 
aggregate banking system capital. For the identification of these crises, we rely on existing 
studies. An episode is considered a banking crisis if it qualifies as such according to either 
Bordo et al (2001) or Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999). 
•  Our definition of an asset market crisis, both for stock and property, is based on the 
methodology of Bordo and Jeanne (2002). Asset price crises are determined on the basis of 
moving averages of the growth rate in asset prices in comparison to their long-run historical 
average. More specifically, a bust is defined as a period in which average growth over 
a  12-quarter window is smaller than a threshold. This threshold is the average 
growth rate in the asset price in all countries over the entire sample (g ), minus x times its 








l t i v x g
g
 








l t i ν x g
g
 
  The three-year window is also chosen by Bordo and Jeanne (2002), and is sufficient to filter 
out short-term volatility. The parameter x is calibrated such that the main boom and bust 
periods in the stock market and the housing market are selected, without including too many 
observations.
5 Although this methodology is ad hoc, it is reassuring that most of the boom-bust 
periods are plausible when compared to other sources. In particular, most boom-bust patterns 
closely match the results of Bordo and Jeanne (2002), despite some differences between their 
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data set and ours.
6 Following our procedure, 25 major stock market crashes and 23 residential 
property crises have occurred since 1970 in the 20 industrialised countries concerned. 
The macroeconomic variables we consider around crisis periods are: short-term and long-term 
interest rates, inflation, industrial production, the ratio between credit outstanding and nominal GDP, 
money and credit growth, and asset prices (shares and residential property).
7 
3.2  The incidence of crises 
Graphs 1-3 summarise the crisis periods for all countries in our sample. For asset prices, we include 
both the boom and bust episodes, the latter presented with a negative sign. Some striking differences 
can be seen across subperiods. During the 1970s there were only two banking crises, but quite a few 
asset market busts. The practical absence of banking crises must be seen against the background of 
highly regulated financial markets in those years. Stock market crises were heavily concentrated in the 
high-inflation years 1973-77, when real economic prospects were bleak. Presumably, there was a 
flight into property, the traditional safeguard against high inflation, which partly explains the high 
frequency of property booms in the mid-1970s. These house price increases turned out to be 
excessive, since in the late 1970s many property markets collapsed. 
Graph 1 
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In the early 1980s, there was a boom in stock markets, but a bust in property prices. The decline in 
inflation and high real interest rates were important factors behind the poor performance of property 
markets. These factors, together with an improvement in economic prospects, made stocks more 
attractive to investors. 
Most banking crises in our sample are concentrated in the period 1984-93. One of the explanations for 
this may be that there were high and increasing real interest rates undermining the profitability of the 
banking sector. In the early 1980s, US real interest rates reached their highest level in the postwar 
period. In addition, the high frequency of banking crises in the 1980s and early 1990s can be partly 
attributed to financial market reform and capital market liberalisation, which often took place in the 
years preceding these crises. Interestingly, these crises developed despite a high degree of price 
stability in the years concerned. They occurred after a boom in stock prices in the early 1980s, and 
more or less coincided with stock market crises (1987, early 1990s) and bad performance on property 
markets (early 1990s). These factors are in line with our theoretical considerations in Section 2, and is 
discussed in greater detail below. 
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Graph 2 
Stock market booms/busts 
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In the 1990s, stock and property markets moved much more in tandem than in the 1970s. This is not 
surprising, given reduced inflation and liberalised capital markets in these years. Interestingly, stock 
markets seem to lead property markets. In both markets, boom-bust cycles have occurred since 1985 
despite price stability and free capital markets in most countries during this subperiod. Hence, these 
factors are no guarantee of financial stability. 
Over the whole period, it is striking that both banking and asset price crises seem to occur in bunches. 
This is most clearly visible for stock markets, which is no surprise as these are strongly intertwined 
internationally. Although property markets and banking are more nationally oriented, crises in these 
markets also tend to be particularly concentrated in specific subperiods. Especially in the early 1990s, 
the three types of crisis coincided. While these patterns suggest that crises have common roots, the 
concentration of financial crises may also signal contagion. 360  BIS Papers No 19
 
3.3  Behaviour of variables around crises  
In this section, we consider average patterns of some key macroeconomic variables 12 quarters 
before and after crisis periods. Graph 4 shows the extent to which these variables deviate from their 
levels at the start of a crisis during the run-up phase (periods –12 to 0) and how much they depart 
from their levels in the aftermath of these episodes (periods 0 to 12). The crisis period itself is not 
considered here.
8 The data shown are averages, which may of course mask important differences 
across episodes. In the Appendix, we present the same graph plus a range determined by adding and 
subtracting one standard deviation, as a rough measure of dispersion, to check the robustness of 
average patterns. One should be cautious, however, of interpreting this range as a confidence interval, 
as the distributions of individual cases tend to be non-symmetric while the standard deviations are 
sometimes increased substantially by one or two outliers.
9 
• Short-  and  long-term  interest rates rise significantly during the quarters preceding both 
housing market and stock market busts, whereas they remain more or less constant prior to 
banking crises. Short-term interest rates rise particularly rapidly prior to stock market busts - 
almost 4 percentage points in two years. This suggests that interest hikes are one of the 
proximate causes of such crises. 
•  In this context, it is also interesting to observe that inflation increases prior to bust periods in 
stock markets - about 2 percentage points, on average - and, albeit not very significantly, 
before property crises. By contrast, there is no clear pattern for inflation just before banking 
crises. Presumably, contractionary monetary policy to control inflation is an important trigger 
for crises in asset markets. After a banking crisis, inflation drops significantly - about   
3 percentage points - while stock market busts are initially followed by higher inflation. 
•  Another, more forward-looking way to examine interest rates and inflation pressures is by 
considering the yield curve, ie the difference between the long- and short-term interest rates 
presented in the first two panels. About two to three years before a stock market crisis, the 
yield curve steepens significantly, which correctly signals an acceleration in inflation. One 
year before the stock market crisis starts, however, the yield curve flattens again, which is 
largely due to a strong increase in the short-term interest rates. The yield curve also flattens 
on average prior to a property market crisis, but this pattern is not very robust across 
different episodes (see the Appendix). In the case of bank crises, the yield curve does not 
even show any clear pattern, in line with the behaviour of interest rates. Altogether, changes 
in the yield curve suggest that especially the stock market is forward-looking, implying that 
expectations play a greater role in triggering a stock market bust than in the case of both 
other types of crisis. 
•  Particularly in the run-up phase to a stock market crisis, industrial production  growth 
increases, while it does not show a clear pattern before the other two types of crisis. 
Consistent with the inflation patterns described above, stock market crises typically develop 
in periods of a booming economy - reflecting a positive perception that the boom will 
continue - while many banking crises and housing market busts may be the result of an 
economic slowdown. Note, however, that just before a stock market crisis, the acceleration 
in industrial production growth slows significantly, probably due to the short-term interest rate 
increase. Asset crisis episodes are immediately followed by a significant slowdown. Negative 
wealth effects possibly play a role here, in combination with reduced future prospects, 
reflected by forward-looking share prices. 
•  Excessive credit growth is often seen as an important underlying cause of asset bubbles and 
(to some extent) relatedly, banking crises. In particular, Borio and Lowe (2002) stress the 
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importance of the credit/GDP ratio as a leading indicator of financial crises.
10 This finding is 
especially corroborated for property crises and banking crises, which are preceded by a 
significant increase in this ratio, while after the crisis periods this increase slows somewhat.
11 
By contrast, prior to a stock market crisis the credit/GDP ratio rises only marginally; our 
dispersion measure shows that this increase is not robust (see the Appendix). This 
difference between on the one hand housing and banking crises and on the other hand stock 
market crises might be due to the fact that the former two categories are more closely 
related to the domestic economies, while share prices are typically correlated with the major 
stock markets abroad. This also explains our finding above, in Graph 2, that stock market 
crises in various countries are more concentrated in particular years than both other crisis 
categories. Hence, excessive domestic credit growth is more likely to cause financial 
problems in domestic markets than in internationally oriented stock markets. To some extent, 
this may be seen as a refinement of Borio and Lowe’s results, which are primarily based on 
an aggregate index including both property and equity prices. 
•  Given the behaviour of the credit ratio, it may be interesting to look at the patterns of money 
and credit growth rates. Before all three types of crisis, money growth (both M1 and M3) 
slows on average, albeit not very significantly (see the Appendix), while credit growth does 
not follow a clear pattern. All in all, the credit ratio appears to be a more reliable indicator for 
financial strains than money and credit growth, which underscores the importance of 
cumulative processes rather than growth rates. 
•  Finally, we consider the behaviour of asset prices. Typically, the growth rate of both stock 
and house prices drops significantly prior to a banking crisis, which suggests they may be 
one of the underlying causes. After a stock market bust, share prices continue their 
downward path for some time (about four quarters). The growth rate of real house prices 
drops after all three types of crisis, including a stock market crisis, when the growth rate 
drops by 15 percentage points in six quarters. This is in line with Graphs 1-3, which indicate 
that stock markets seem to lead property markets.
12 
By and large, the patterns shown in Graph 4 are in line with the discussion in Section 2 and with 
previous empirical studies (see, for example, Borio and Lowe (2002)). At the same time, one should 
be cautious when interpreting our results for two reasons. First of all, we have mainly presented 
stylised facts; in order to draw stronger conclusions one should formulate stricter hypotheses and 
carry out more rigorous testing. For instance, it would be interesting to analyse combinations of 
variables, to correct for country-specific factors, and to look more precisely at different subperiods. 
Second, our analysis is only of limited use for predicting crises. We focus on the behaviour of some 
key variables around crisis episodes, which does not imply that these are always good leading 
indicators for financial crises. This would require a further analysis of type one and type two errors. We 
are planning to address these issues in future work. 
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Graph 4 
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4. Concluding  remarks 
For more than a decade now, the industrialised world has experienced overall macroeconomic 
stability. This is an important change from the 1970s and early 1980s, which were characterised by 
both high and volatile inflation, as well as heavily regulated domestic and international capital markets. 
With price stability and liberalised capital markets more or less in place in the western world, prospects 
for long-run economic performance are favourable. However, as our paper illustrates, banking and 
asset market crises can occur in spite of macroeconomic stability. A key lesson of recent decades is 
that monetary policy needs to be forward-looking to address risks to price stability. Theory suggests 
that in doing so, monetary policy contributes to financial stability, since price stability makes financial 
crises less likely to emerge. Monetary policy must also be forward-looking to address financial stability 
risks if we are to avoid the damage to the real economy caused by downward corrections that threaten 
the banking system and financial stability. However, it is very difficult to identify financial imbalances in 
advance, particularly in the current environment of price stability. A central bank with a high degree of 
credibility runs the risk that inflationary pressures first manifest themselves in asset markets rather 
than goods markets. We have presented some evidence that an increase in the credit/GDP ratio 
indicates a build-up in financial strains, especially during the run-up to housing market busts and 
banking crises. This result is in line with Borio and Lowe (2002). We have also investigated several 
other indicators. An important conclusion is that interest rate hikes - although they are less likely in an 
environment of price stability - seem to have remained an important trigger for asset price crises. This 
is particularly so for short-term interest rates. Another finding is that banking crises and property crises 
are more nationally oriented. This arises from the fact that they are less correlated internationally, and 
seem to have a stronger relationship with domestic credit growth. Finally, a result that warrants further 
research is that bust periods in the housing market systematically follow stock market crises. Although 
this may simply be due to the fact that stock prices are more forward-looking, there might also be a 
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Appendix (cont): 
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Appendix (cont): 





























































-12 -9 -6  -3  0  3  6  9  12




-12 -10 -8  -6  -4  -2  0  2  4  6  8  10 12 







-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
 
M3 BIS Papers No 19  367
 
References 
Bakker, A F P and B R Chapple (2002): “Advanced country experiences with capital account 
liberalization”, IMF Occasional Paper, no 214. 
Bernanke, B S and M Gertler (1989): “Agency costs, collateral, and business fluctuations”, American 
Economic Review, vol 79, pp 14-31. 
Bordo, M D, M J Dueker and D C Wheelock (2000): “Aggregate price shocks and financial instability: 
an historical analysis”, NBER Working Paper, no 7652. 
Bordo, M, B Eichengreen, D Klingebiel and M S Martinez-peria (2001): “Is the crisis problem growing 
more severe?”, Economic Policy, April, pp 53-82.  
Bordo, M D and O Jeanne (2002): “Boom-busts in asset prices, economic instability, and monetary 
policy”, NBER Working Paper, no 8966. 
Borio, C and P Lowe (2002): “Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus”, BIS 
Working Papers, no 114. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A and E Detragiache (1998): “Financial liberalization and financial fragility”, IMF 
Working Paper, no 98/83. 
Kaminsky, G L and C M Reinhart (1999): “The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-
payments problems”, American Economic Review, vol 89, no 3, pp 473-500. 
Mehrez, G and D Kaufmann (1999): “Transparency, liberalization and financial crises”, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, no 2286. 
Mishkin, F S (1991): “Asymmetric information and financial crises: a historical perspective”, in   
R G Hubbard (ed), Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pp 69-108. 
——— (2000): “Financial stability and the macroeconomy”, Central Bank of Iceland Working Paper,  
no 9, May. 
Netherlands Bank (2002): “Impact of stock market strongest in housing market’s top segment”, 
Quarterly Bulletin, September, pp 33-8. 
Schwartz, A J (1995): “Why financial stability depends on price stability”, Economic Affairs, Autumn,  
pp 21-5. 
Sutton, G D (2002): “Explaining changes in house prices”, BIS Quarterly Review, September,   
pp 46-55. 